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"So among the experiments that may be tried on man, those that
can only harm are forbidden, those that are innocent are permissible,
and those that may do good are obligatory."' These clear precepts
established in another century by the French physiologist, Claude
Bernard, represent a distillate of most of the ethical principles of
modern investigators. Indeed, Bernard's guidelines would be sufficient
today were it not for the fact that they apply only to the decisions
of the experimenting physician and not to the interaction between
that investigator and his human subject. They would be complete had
Bernard written: "So among the experiments that may be tried on
consenting man .

... "

Much of the debate concerning research on human subjects has
been engendered by groups or individuals who perceive certain biomedical studies as profound violations of the principles of informed
consent. Though many investigators would prefer to carry on this
debate within the confines of the medical community, it is obvious that
society has moved beyond the cozy period during which professionals
could establish their own rules of conduct absent consultation with the
broader community. Seventy years ago, Walter Reed was a national
hero for illuminating the cause and prevention of yellow fever by deliberately exposing volunteers to that fatal disease. A great hospital
is now named for him. Today, he might possibly be sentenced to
prison by an outraged community, for it is increasingly apparent that
our society is, in general, unwilling to acquire biomedical information,
no matter the import, at the expense of the weak, the unprotected, or
the zealous, ill-informed volunteer. Perhaps the growing national distrust of all technicrats, from nuclear experts to supersonic aircraft
engineers, now includes biomedical investigators. A return to the
eighteenth and nineteenth century body snatcher image of the medical
scientist is in progress in certain circles.
Indeed, on rare occasions, biomedical scientists have earned their
newly awarded opprobium. Reports of dangerous experiments carried out without adequate informed consent have occasionally appeared
t Chief, Division of Hematology-Oncology, Children's Hospital Medical Center
and Pediatrician in Chief, Sidney Farber Cancer Institute, Boston, Massachusetts.
Professor of Pediatrics, Harvard Medical School. A.B., Harvard College, 1951; M.D.,
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during the past ten years. Such reports are infrequent, but the public
must wonder whether they constitute the tip of an iceberg.
In response to public rumblings of suspicion, the National Institute of Health (NIH), the major funding source of biomedical research in the United States, has expended a large effort to determine
the actual risk of research on human subjects, at least among its own
grantees. In fact, that risk is not greater than the risks incurred in a
control population; but more importantly, NIH has imposed increasingly complex controls over the independent decisions of the individual
investigators who are its grantees. The authority of hospital review
committees and their public members over the design of protocols involving human investigation is increasing.
Though this NIH action has been very useful and reassuring,
one of the most vexing problems that has yet to be resolved is the
value of informed consent in certain populations. For example, does
the loyal patient of a devoted physician actually give "informed consent" when that physician asks the patient to consent to an investigative procedure? Even if a third party makes the request, the very
knowledge that a particular physician is the investigator can be enough
to influence the patient's judgment. Bernard must have recognized
that problem. He puts the entire onus of responsibility for the "right"
decision directly on the physician.2 The quality of the patient's consent is ignored. A further example is the soldier or the prisoner. Both
are in a chain of command, and the latter is desperate for approval,
relief from tedium and, above all, freedom. Can either make informed,
voluntary decisions?
The third major group to cause confusion and debate are children.
Can parents consent to nontherapeutic research on their children?
Will a parent consent to such procedures on "behalf" of one child to
whom he or she relates poorly, while zealously protecting a favorite
from any potentially unnecessary procedures? None of the above
ethical questions are easy to resolve. In practice, they are approached
on a case-by-case basis using institutional review committees and other
techniques which, while cumbersome, represent at least a halting start
toward clarification through experience. But all of the above problems
appear absurdly simple when they are compared with the use of the
pregnant woman and her fetus as subjects of medical research.
On the surface, research on the fetuses of pregnant women who
plan to give birth would appear to raise more important and delicate
concerns. But, curiously, this does not appear to be the case, because
abortion is not involved, and because it is generally believed that the
2. Id. at 101-02.
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mother will exercise caution and the obstetrician and pediatrician involved in such research will, above all, protect the health and welfare of
the mother and the fetus. It is the use of the pregnant woman and her
about-to-be-aborted fetus as subjects of research that seriously impacts upon the fundamental principle of protection of the weak and induces passionate theological responses. When medical research, no
matter what its nature, is performed upon a fetus that is to be aborted,
society may gain valuable information from that particular abortion.
Many of those who violently oppose abortion on a theological or
ethical basis wish to deny any societal gain from what they consider a
heinous act. They insist that the research be prohibited. In fact, the
more valuable the research results may be, the more some would condemn them, because widespread appreciation of the results might increase public acceptance of abortion.
Perhaps this controversy would have been limited to a few religious or secular professional groups, but the Roe v. Wade' decision
dispelled any hope for containment. Once the opponents of abortion
lost political control over the abortion procedure, even in those states
where they believed that they held a majority, only one avenue was
left open to them - a constitutional amendment that would limit the
practice. To accomplish such an amendment in the face of determined
liberal opposition would necessarily require neutralization of any general societal gains from the procedure. Research on the about-to-beaborted fetus became a prime target of abortion opponents. Prodded
by angry constituents, local district attorneys began to prowl through
hospital laboratories in search of potential villains. False horror
stories involving decapitated fetuses and other ugly practices were
infiltrated into hastily arranged hearings. The Boston "Antibiotic"
case, in which reasonable physicians were actually indicted for grave
robbing, the catastrophic trial of Doctor Kenneth Edelin in the same
city,4 and a flurry of state laws regulating and even abolishing fetal
research5 began to dominate the headlines. As local anti-abortionists
and medical investigators began loudly to confront one another, the
cacophony began to rise out of the state legislative assemblies and into
the halls of the United States Congress.
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. See Commonwealth v. Edelin, __ Mass. _-, 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976) (reversing the conviction of Dr. Edelin). See generally Culliton, Edelin Trial: Jury Not
Persuaded by Scientists for the Defense, 187 Science 814-16 (1975) ; Culliton, Manslaughter: The Charge Against Edelin of Boston City Hospital, 186 Science 327-30

(1974).
5. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12J (West Supp. 1976-77)
(amended 1976).
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As the pressure mounted, the strategy of the anti-abortionists became apparent. Many abortions are underwritten by Medicaid funds.
If these funds could be restricted, as well as funds for fetal research,
both abortion and its research benefits could be curtailed. A twopronged legislative attack was designed: 1) Stop all federally funded
fetal research; 2) Stop all Medicaid funding for abortions and link that
bill to the total medical research budget. The latter move would, they
thought, neutralize the investigators who might be willing to forego
research on the fetus and would not protest discrimination against the
poor if preservation of the total research budget was at stake.
In fact, neither stratagem was effective. Federal support for fetal
research goes on, and federal courts have declared the second approach
unconstitutional.6 The court decisions were expected by most thoughtful jurists and probably even by those who enacted tie legislative restrictions in the first place. The first issue, however, research on the
fetus, was far more complex. Its resolution required careful diplomacy,
reasonable attention to opposing views, good will and, above all, hard
work. In light of those demands, the thoughtful guidelines which were
established by the report (Report) of the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research
(Commission) 7 should be considered an outstanding achievement. It
should be emphasized that the Commission was created in an advisory
role to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) ,8 Its
deliberations were carried out during a moratorium on federally funded
fetal research,' but its conclusions were not binding on then Secretary
Weinberger. In fact, the Report of the Commission prompted the Secretary to accept all but one of its recommendations and to lift the
moratorium. 10
Though the Commissioners performed their labors during a period
of increasing national controversy when charges of political domination
6. See McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Klein v. Nassau
County Med. Center, 409 F. Supp. 731 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp.

660 (D. Conn. 1975).
7. NATIONAL COMMISSION

FOR THE

PROTECTION OF HUMAN

SUBJECTS OF

Bio-

MEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH ON
76-127, 1975), also printed in 40 Fed. Reg.
THE FETUS (DHEW Pub. No. (OS)

33,530 (1975)

(partially codified in 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.301 (1976))

as COMMISSION'S REPORT].

[hereinafter cited

For the reader's convenience, chapters VIII and IX of

the Commission's Report are reprinted in this symposium at pp. 300-24, and unless
otherwise indicated, all citations to the Commission's Report refer to these pages.
For a careful review of the Commission's Report, see Ingelfinger, Ethics of Human
Experimentation Defined by a National Commission, 296 NEw ENGLAND J. MED.

44 (1977).
8. National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, §§ 201-205, 88 Stat. 342 (1974).
9. Id. § 213.
10. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-.301 (1976).
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by religious groups filled the air, the deliberations proved to be conducted at a very high level, and very valuable ethical concepts emerged.
In addition, the Report offers, in lay language, a pr&is of the current
state of the art of fetal physiology, the care of the premature, and the
technology of prenatal diagnosis of inherited disease. It is a document
well worth careful study.
Before analyzing the Report, a brief review of a certain form of
research on the about-to-be-aborted fetus would help the lay reader to
understand much of the investigator's dilemma. Sickle cell anemia and
Cooley's anemia are two inherited disorders of the blood that cause
disability and usually death at an early age. Cooley's anemia is more
severe. This disease occurs predominantly in the countries bordering
the Mediterranean Sea. It is sometimes called Mediterranean anemia or
thalassemia (sea in the blood). It also occurs in the Middle East, India,
the Far East and Africa. It is estimated that some 60,000 children are
born each year with Cooley's anemia. A roughly equal number of
children are born each year with sickle cell anemia, mainly in Africa or
in countries such as the United States where large numbers of Americans of African descent reside. Cooley's anemia is less common in the
United States than sickle cell anemia, because ethnic outbreeding is
more common in Caucasians than Blacks. In any case, without particular regard for case incidence in the United States, these two serious
inherited diseases of the blood are more common worldwide than is
childhood acute leukemia.
When two carriers, or heterozygotes, of either sickle cell anemia
or Cooley's anemia mate, there is one chance in four that the fetus of
any pregnancy developed by the couple will inherit the abnormal gene
from both parents and have so-called homozygous sickle cell anemia or
homozygous Cooley's anemia. In many cases, the difficult and short
life of the homozygote is enough to persuade heterozygous parents at
risk to abort all pregnancies rather than take the one out of four chance
that the fetus may be a homozygote. The purpose of prenatal diagnosis
of such inherited diseases is to permit such parents to have children
without fear. A perfect prenatal diagnostic test identifies homozygotes
unequivocally and clearly separates them from normal or heterozygote
fetuses. Only the homozygote is aborted. The other three pregnancies
go to term. Thus, when a technique for prenatal diagnosis is operating
optimally, three out of four about-to-be-aborted fetuses are salvaged.
Without prenatal diagnosis, none of these fetuses would be salvaged.
The entire effort of research in this area of prenatal diagnosis has,
therefore, as its ultimate aim, the retention of fetal life in the vast
proportion of cases.
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The techniques necessary for a prenatal diagnostic test, however,
must often be developed by studying fetuses that are about to be electively aborted. For example, in Cooley's anemia or sickle cell anemia,
the prenatal diagnostic test currently demands that the investigator take
a small sample of the circulating red cells of the fetus. This he can do
by samplying the fetal blood supply to the placenta. This is a far more
technically difficult and even potentially more hazardous technique than
is the simple sampling of the amniotic fluid that surrounds the fetus
(amniocentesis). The latter fluid contains certain fetal skin cells that
can be used for many prenatal diagnoses. Unfortunately, these cells
cannot be used for the diagnosis of Cooley's anemia or sickle cell anemia
because they do not produce hemoglobin. Furthermore, a test for an
inherited disease in the fetus can scarcely be created without detailed
knowledge of the variations in normal fetuses.
When the laboratory and the obstetrical units associated with us
began to approach the problem of the development of the technology for
such prenatal diagnoses in fetal red cells, we were immediately confronted with two ethical problems in potential conflict. One ethical
precept is derived from Bernard's statement that experiments that may
do good are obligatory." There is no question that the successful outcome of research to develop a good prenatal diagnostic test for the
inherited disorders of hemoglobin would have a good outcome; therefore, under Bernard's precept, the research is obligatory. However, a
second precept is that experiments that can only do harm are forbidden.
At the time that the necessary obstetrical research needed to be done to
derive a method for fetal blood sampling, it was not clear that such an
approach might not do harm either by injury or inaccuracy. It certainly
could be envisaged that an aspiration of blood from the placenta could
itself endanger the pregnancy or that the inherent variations within
normal fetuses could obfuscate diagnoses. Therefore, it was decided
that initial experience with tiny samples must be gathered in the aboutto-be-aborted fetus since the pregnancy would be terminated in any case
and larger samples would be available post-abortion to test reliability.
Once it could be shown that fetal blood could be acquired with reasonable safety at the time of the intended abortion and that the test was
sufficiently accurate, the technology could then be applied to those pregnancies where there was a known risk of the inherited anemia. In
other words, the investigators of the problem felt that the risk of the
development of this technique should be shared among many different
mothers and not be borne solely by the mothers whose pregnancies
were threatened by the risk of inherited anemia.
11. See C.

BERNARD,

supra note 1, at 101.
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This ethical judgment as to fetal research clashes with a cardinal
principle of those who oppose the research on equally strong ethical
grounds. The opponents believe that the fetus is a person who cannot
give informed consent; that the fetus about to be aborted is completely
defenseless; that it has been abandoned by its mother; and that, therefore, such research practices, no matter what their benefits might be,
constitute an unethical attack onthe dying, by the researcher. Ethicists
and theologians who take the latter position do so for two reasons. The
first is the aversion to abortion itself and the unwillingness to see any
benefit from the procedure. The second is the fear that somehow the,
research conducted on the fetus may actually be a very ugly affair
characterized by potential pain or anguish in the fetus before it is summarily executed. The possibility that investigators might perform or
tolerate ghastly intrauterine intrusions prior to abortion because they
do not think of the fetus as a person, creates deep moral and ethical
concerns. Indeed, a few of my colleagues occasionally lend some credence to that fear by referring to the fetus as just "a piece of tissue."
Obviously the fetus is not just any piece of tissue. The fetus may not
be a person in the legal sense, but common sense and common dignity
elevate it above the status of a gallbladder. The potential of a gallbladder is to become an older gallbladder, whereas the fetus has the
potential to become a person. Callous disregard of that special status
of the fetus, no matter what its gestational age, brutalizes the investigator and violates an important ethic. Furthermore, it is arrogant and
stupid to conclude that all those who share such concerns are members
of a single religious denomination, are uneducated, are against prenatal
diagnosis, or are even against all selective abortion. These stereotypes
are misapplied. Given absolute assurances of respect for the totality of
pregnancy, many concerned individuals (some of whom are as expert
in their fields as researchers claim to be) can find ways to permit important research to flourish while preventing mindless acts of potential
cruelty. In fact, although the obstetrical component of research in this
area has been temporarily halted in Massachusetts, it will probably
resume in the near future largely because of the efforts of those who
previously led the original attack against unbridled fetal research.
Too often, a strident hostility towards the university based medical
establishment where fetal research is performed and an overzealous use
of political pressure complicate the discussion. It should be mentioned
that the intrusion of anti-abortion groups into the political process, and
even into the judicial process, as witnessed by the Edelin trial, has
created a very serious backlash among the liberals and a wave of antiorthodoxy that is unfortunate and often unfair. In fact, it appears
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that certain members of the "Right to Life" groups have begun to be
somewhat damaged by their own successes. Many politicians and increasing numbers of the general public are beginning to recognize that
they have perhaps been led astray. It is one thing to take a firm stand
against abortion. It is quite another matter to attack research that
will prevent abortion or reduce birth defects. The attacks by "Pro-life"
or "Right to Life" groups against the National Foundation March of
Dimes were unwise. That organization has done as much for improvement of maternal and child health as any private organization in the
country. Because the foundation supports research on the developing
fetus, it became the object of utterly mindless calumny. This sort of
blunderbuss attack tends to turn away more thoughtful individuals who
also cannot tolerate abortion or cruelty to the defenseless, but who have
the capacity to look at the entire issue broadly. In light of all of this
conflict, the work of the Commission is all the more admirable. The
membership was obviously chosen to ensure a broad range of opinions,
a high level of intelligence, and a capacity to absorb a great deal of
information.
There are two major features of the Report and the subsequent
regulations (Regulations)1 2 which must be studied in great detail. The
first deals with activities directed toward fetuses in utero as subjects.
The Regulations state:
No fetus in utero may be involved as a subject of any activity
covered by this subpart unless:
(1) The purpose of the activity is to meet the health needs of the
particular fetus and the fetus will be placed at risk only to the
minimum extent necessary to meet such needs, or
(2) the risk to the fetus imposed by the research is minimal and
the purpose of the activity is the development of important
biomedical
knowledge which cannot be obtained by any other
3
means.'
The Regulations would permit the necessary research for improved
prenatal diagnostic methods but would require extremely careful review of procedure at a local and national level. 4
With respect to nontherapeutic research directed toward the nonviable fetus ex utero, the Commission recommended that such research
might be carried out under stringent limitations, particularly if the
fetus is less than twenty weeks gestation, but made it clear that no such
research be carried out which might alter the duration of life of the
12. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-301 (1976).

13. Id. § 46.208(a).
14. See id. §§ 46.204-.205.
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nonviable fetus ex utero.15 This last recommendation was not accepted
by the Secretary of HEW, and the final regulations stated:
No nonviable fetus may be involved as a subject in an activity
covered by this subpart unless:
(1) Vital functions of the fetus will not be artificially maintained
except where the purpose of the activity is to develop new
methods for enabling fetuses to survive to the point of viability,
(2) experimental activities which of themselves would terminate
the heartbeat or respiration of the fetus will not be employed,
and
(3) the purpose of the activities is the development of important
biomedical
knowledge which cannot be obtained by other
0
means.'
The Secretary of HEW evidently did not follow the recommendations of the Commission in this single area because he was persuaded
that the ban on fetal research, which might lengthen the life of the
fetus ex utero, would seriously impede the development of the technology necessary to maintain life in very premature infants. Here, two
ethical concerns conflict once again. On one hand, many thoughtful
ethicists find repugnant the idea of attaching hopelessly nonviable
fetuses to life support machines, all in the name of science. They conjure
up the image of rows of helpless humanoids boxed in isolettes, their
tiny chests helplessly pumped up and down by mechanical respirators
while doctors draw body fluids from every orifice. On the other hand,
the legislature of the state of California has just passed a law making
it a criminal offense for an obstetrician to fail to offer the ultimate in
life support systems to aborted fetuses which might possibly be considered viable.17 Thus, a group of individuals operating from the same
general concern for fetal life has become internally polarized. In fact,
an obstetrician operating in good faith under the Regulations for the
protection of fetuses would be at risk of losing all federal grant support
if he obeyed the California law and applied full support technology to
a fetus later determined to be nonviable. On the other hand, if he followed the Regulations and failed to provide such support, he would be
in danger of imprisonment under the California legislation.' 8 Little
15. See COMMISSION's REPORT, supra note 7, at 312.
16. 45 C.F.R. § 46.209(b) (1976).
17. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955.9 (West 1976) (misdemeanor).
18. Id. It should be noted that while the obstetrician is in a practical dilemma,
he is not in a legal dilemma, because the Regulations make it clear that in such a
situation, state law controls. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.201 (b) (1976). Thus, the obstetrician
is bound to follow state law.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1977], Art. 10

1976-19771

FETAL RESEARCH

wonder that the Secretary of HEW has considered a proposal to permit
responsible investigators and hospitals to carry out important studies
of the nonviable fetus ex utero under strict institutional controls and
with the oversight of a national ethical review board if necessary. 19
What is the future of fetal research in the United States now that
the Commission has reported, the wave of inhibitory fetal research laws
appears to have peaked, and limited research is being undertaken once
again?
First of all, the scientific community has probably learned a great
deal from the events of the last three or four years. It has relearned
what has been drummed home repeatedly: the general public is concerned about the ethics of medical investigation. The public is unwilling to accept benefits at too high a risk - either to the community or
to the individuals. Public leaders must be kept informed of research
developments and needs if necessary support is to be gained and suspicion allayed. The biomedical community must remember that in the
public mind it is associated with all other technocrats, and responsible inclusion of public representatives into future research planning is mandatory.
Public leaders, including those who represent the concerns of
"Right to Life" organizations, must come to grips with another reality.
While many biomedical investigators carry out their work for the
benefit of patients, it is beyond argument that there is often self-interest
involved. Almost all researchers have ego involvement in their work,
but the motivating force behind clinical investigation is the welfare of
particular patients now or in the future. No group representing ethical
concerns can prevent for very long what the responsible clinical investigator honestly believes to be in the best interest of patients. Although work on the development of techniques for prenatal diagnosis
of abnormal hemoglobins was stopped in Massachusetts after passage
of a restrictive fetal research law, 20 the work continued at a reasonably
rapid rate because the Massachusetts investigators allied themselves
with colleagues in London and New Haven, Connecticut. Had roadblocks been erected in London and New Haven, another co-operative
enterprise would have been generated, because the work had to go
on for the benefit of the parents at risk. Furthermore, it was clear to
almost all dispassionate observers that the work was highly ethical and
19. See 42 Fed. Reg. 2,792-93 (1977) (proposed amendment to 45 C.F.R. §
24.209). This amendment would permit activities directed toward the nonviable fetus
ex utero where the purpose of such activity is to bring the subject fetus to the point

of viability. Id.
20. See MAss.
1976).

GEN. LAWS

ANN. ch. 112, § 125 (West) (Supp. 1976-77) (amended
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was carried out in a reasonable fashion. In fact, many individuals who
opposed the work initially now see it as a valuable method by which
more babies may be born, and for this reason these early opponents
have successfully sought ways to modify the Massachusetts laws in
order to permit the work to move forward in the Commonwealth. A
very interesting addition to the Massachusetts law has reduced the risk
of unexpected indictment2 ' and should encourage responsible investigators to return to their research after careful institutional review.
The negotiations necessary on the local scene have been substantially aided by the example of the powerfully constructive thinking
generated by the Commission. There seems little question that productive and high quality fetal research will resume in the United States.
There will be careful limits. There will be public discussion. But the
work will move forward, and as a result, the health and welfare of pregnant women and their fetuses will be maintained and improved.2 2
21. See 1976 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 337-42 (to be codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 112, § 12J). The law itself permits diagnostic or remedial procedures if
the purpose is to determine the life or health of the fetus or preserve the life or health
of the fetus or mother. Id. at 337. Of paramount importance to the physician or
reseacher is the fact that the amendment provides for a complete defense from prosecution if (1) a court has not previously found the particular research protocol in
question violative of the substantive requirements of the section and, (2) if the
physician or researcher has obtained prior written approval of the procedure from an
Institutional Review Board. Id. at 338. In addition, the amendment provides that
[a] copy of the written approval, together with any attached protocol or other
writing, shall be filed with the office of the District Attorney for the county in
which the hospital or other institution for which the board acts, is located. Such
copy shall be available for public inspection at reasonable times.
Id.
22. For additional reading, see generally 40 Fed. Reg. 33,526-52 (1975) (Protection of Human Subjects, Part III: Fetuses, Pregnant Women, and In Vitro
Fertilization) ; H. HARRIS, PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS AND SELECTIVE ABORTION (1975);
ANN.

P. RAMSEY, THE ETHICS OF FETAL RESEARCH (1975); THE MORALITY OF ABORTION
(J. Noonan ed. 1970); The Advisory Group to Department of Health and Social
Security, The Use of Fetuses and Fetal Material for Research (Her Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1972), reprinted in NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, Appendix to REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS: RESEARCH ON THE FETUS 19-1 to 19-17 (DHEW Pub.
No. (OS) 76-128, 1976) ; Gaylin & Lappe, Fetal Politics, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May,
1975, at 66; Scarf, The Fetus as Guinea Pig, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 13.
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